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At present the Trans-Siberian Railway is an important transportation network connecting Siberia 
to European Russia. It is almost totally self sustainable. Little is known, however, that during its 
construction in the late 1890s and early 1900s the Northern Sea Route had been widely employed 
to deliver various construction materials and river-craft to the Yenisei River. There were three such 
expeditions: 1893, 1894, and 1905. The article describes the logistics of the aforementioned and refers 
to cooperation between British maritime business and the Russian Imperial Government.
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Introduction
In the early 1890s Siberia was a land the 
economy of which had been dynamically 
developing for the previous half century. This 
had been not only a consequence of rapid 
national economic development, but also a 
result of growing interest in Siberian natural 
wealth throughout the world. Though the rates 
of traditional to Central Siberia gold mining had 
significantly decreased by the 1870s, the prospect 
of applying new machinery and methods in this 
industry seemed a fortunate opportunity to 
many. As Siberia was becoming more and more 
studied, and the results of these studies were 
becoming known to the world, a transportation 
route linking Europe to the Pacific Ocean via 
Siberia was becoming vitally important for the 
Russian Imperial government. This decision 
was a combination of national and geopolitical 
interests.
This route was to become the Trans-Siberian 
Railway – up to this day it remains the longest line 
in the world. It was also to connect Vladivostok to 
Saint Petersburg, linking on its way all the major 
cities of Siberia. 
Before the railway was built there had been 
only a dirt highway – the Moskovskii Trakt as a 
means of getting to Europe. The alternative was 
the use of a complicated system of river tributaries 
connected between each other by portages and, in 
some places, makeshift canals. This route was as 
much complicated as unreliable (Timofeev, 2009: 
177).
The third option was a daring but promising 
route through the Kara Sea and into the mouths 
of the great Siberian rivers: the Ob’ and Yenisei 
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(the western section of the North-East Passage). 
For centuries the navigation of this route had 
been a dream for multiple explorers. In 1874 the 
dream came true with the first to and fro voyage 
of captain Joseph Wiggins – an Englishman who 
took his steamer the Diana from Newcastle-
upon-the-Tyne to the mouth of the Ob’ and back. 
During the latter 1870s and early 1880s this route 
was being exploited by sole prospectors – primary 
Russians, and even by one British company – the 
Phoenix Merchant Adventures Ltd. Yet, due to 
its difficult navigation conditions, which made 
sea travel possible only for about four months 
each year, this was hardly an option for a reliable 
transportation route. 
Nevertheless, the NRS played an important 
role in the development of Siberia and is directly 
connected to the route that turned it from a purely 
Siberian obsession into an Arctic infrastructure – 
the Trans-Siberian Railway. In this research 
we have demonstrated the realization of the 
greatest transportation project in Siberia and its 
interconnection with the Northern Sea Route.
The primary focus of this article is to show 
the connection between the establishment of the 
two vital transportation networks for Siberia – 
the Northern Sea Route and the Trans-Siberian 
Railway.
The secondary theme is the relationship 
between foreigners (primary British) and 
Russians when exploiting the Northern Sea Route. 
Therefore, this article contributes to a debate on 
Russian and foreign sources which on occasion 
state controversial facts. 
Materials and methods
The Northern Sea Route (NRS) as the Trans-
Siberian Railway has been thoroughly studied by 
both Russian and foreign researchers. We can refer 
to the study of D.M. Pinkhenson, in which there 
is a detailed analysis of the NRS establishment. 
Though this study is the first attempt to systematize 
researches on this subject and considers matters of 
politics and economy in the development of the 
transportation route, which makes it a “purely” 
historical study, rather than a study on geographic 
history though Pinkhenson refers to the fact that 
there were two expeditions sent by the Ministry 
of Ways of Communication – one in 1893, and 
the second in 1905, but he is not precise in this 
issue, virtually pointing to it as a fact without any 
significant effects. Pinkhenson mentions the 1893 
Expedition as if it had been exclusively a venture 
of the Imperial Government, neglecting the British 
part in it (Pinkhenson, 1962: 177). 
It is necessary to notice that besides the 
aforementioned study, there are few fundamental 
studies on the history of the NRS in the 1800s 
and early 1900s. The few existing refer either to 
Pinkhenson or H. Johnson, who published the 
memoirs and letters of J. Wiggins having very 
detailed information on all of the expeditions but 
lacking any critical analysis (Johnson, 1907). T. 
Armstrong gives a brief history of the NRS and 
mentions the 1893 – 1894 and 1905 expeditions 
in his narrative about the Soviet polar navigation 
(Armstrong, 1952: 9-10). I. Stone (Scott Polar 
Institute) has a number of studies on the history 
of Russian Arctic exploration. In his article 
about Wiggins in the Arctic Profiles, he again 
mentions the 1893 Expedition – however, this 
only briefly considers the Trans-Siberian Railway 
(Stone, 1994). A notable article – One summer 
at Khabarova – was published by K. Catford of 
the Boat Museum Trust at Ellesmere Port on the 
Mersey. It gives a vivid description of the events 
and locations of the 1893 expedition and its main 
concern is not the theme discussed (Catford, 
2007).
A recent attempt to study has been made by 
L.B. Us – a historian from Novosibirsk, who has 
considered in her study cultural and scientific 
connections between Siberia and Europe1. She 
mentions the voyages of Wiggins to Siberia, 
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including that of 1893 – but this paper lacks any 
serious analysis, giving only a description of 
factual information, which in turn is confused by 
the researcher (e.g. she speaks of granite instead 
of graphite, includes citing of sources which do 
not even mention the topic, and jumps dates).
Studies on the history of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway also rarely refer to the fact that the NSR 
played a noticeable role in the construction of the 
railway. This way they shall not be considered in 
the paper.
This provides an opportunity of conducting a 
research by using historical sources from various 
Siberian and British archives. These are: British 
statistical abstracts e.g. The Board of Trade 
Journal; personal mementos of Wiggins, Peel, 
Vostrotin; official accounts of the expeditions, 
accounts of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and 
various publicist sources from Siberian and 
British journals and newspapers. Such a variety 
of historical sources will supply this research not 
only with factual data, but will give an idea of 
what effects the Trans-Siberian Railway had on 
the Siberian economy and society.
This way an attempt to use exclusively 
Russian sources and studies has been avoided. 
This had been a crucial practice in Russian 
historiography and especially for matters 
concerning international cooperation whether 
productive or not for either of the parties. 
Additionally it is necessary to note that all sources 
and studies have met the proper requirements i.e. 
they are about the aforementioned topic, without 
mentioning unrelated issues. 
Results and discussion 
The controversy of the 1893 Expedition: 
Russian Naval or British commercial 
expedition. Further expeditions:  
1894 and 1905.
Thinking of Siberia, it would be typical to 
imagine a land of dense boreal forests – the taiga, 
wild mountain ranges, fur bearing animals, a 
small number of cities and towns scattered here 
and there at a huge distance from each other, 
virtually making the country uninhabited, and 
the great rivers: the Ob’, Yenisei, and Lena. One 
wouldn’t generally think of the sea or anything 
maritime – the land is too continental. But then 
take a look at those rivers and the tributaries. 
They all begin in the south – some in Mongolia, 
Kazakhstan, and even China, but after thousands 
of miles they dump their waters into the Arctic 
Ocean. If you would had come to Siberia in the 
last decades of the 1800s, you would have heard 
talks about maritime commerce, Britain, exports 
and imports, navigation, and other things that 
would be proper somewhere in Southampton or 
in Arkhangelsk – for that matter – not in Tomsk, 
Krasnoyarsk, or Yeniseysk. A new prospect 
had been opened for landlocked Siberian towns 
which made possible the export of bulky freight 
such as timber, ore, coal, grain, and – most 
important of all – graphite. The latter was vitally 
important for the steel mills of industrial Europe. 
In the end it was graphite that sparked the 
interest to Siberia among foreign businessmen 
and Russian merchants such as M.K. Sidorov 
and A.M. Siberyakov (the man who together 
with Oscar Dickson financed Nordenskjold’s 
expedition). Sidorov invested a sum of over 
1.6 million rubles of personal capitals into the 
development of Arctic navigation in the Kara 
Sea. And it was the English – in the person of 
Captain Joseph Wiggins – who accomplished 
the first successful voyage to Siberia via the 
Kara Sea. A chance for Siberia to become a 
part of the emerging world market became 
obsession number one among its bourgeoisie and 
intelligentsia. Any tsarist attempts to somehow 
regulate the newly emerging commerce were 
treated with repulsive aggression without 
any hesitation. Siberians were not in the taste 
to return to a “colony” of European Russia 
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(Vostorin, 1908). However, by the end of the 
1880s after a series of unsuccessful expeditions 
and the closure of the Phoenix Company, a 
disappointment in Arctic navigation started 
growing in society. Even Siberyakov stopped 
investing Arctic exploration and commerce. 
Problems existed not only in navigation 
matters, but in marketing. The British were not 
into studying the Siberian market and started 
bringing in goods they would export to Canada 
or any other colony. “Supply is the origin of 
demand”, was their logic. Well it turned out 
otherwise. The Siberians were not always willing 
to purchase items such as canned food, shoe 
polish, and candle holders. The result of this 
“blindfold trade” was blunt – the profits did not 
cover the expenses. As for exports – the bulky 
grain, timber, and coal were not worth their 
shipment prices. Cheap timber could be shipped 
from Canada and coal was mined in Wales. 
Graphite turned out to be the only demanded 
Siberian produce but it was not enough to give the 
desired profits to the people running the maritime 
companies, the risks of which reached to over 50 
percent (Goncharov, 2011).
So in the end, the new Northern Sea Route 
did not meet its economical expectations. Siberia 
had not begun to thrive and the most part of its 
economy remained unaffected by Arctic trade. 
Yet, there was a more important affect of early 
British-Siberian trade on Siberian society – there 
was now a feeling that it was possible to exist 
without European Russia. This early separatism 
was not exactly bent on forming a self-governing 
and independent state, but on gaining autonomy 
rights and conducting an independent economical 
policy. Even before the appearance of Siberian-
British commerce, there had been a sense of 
individuality – being different from Russians: so 
it was said, “…here in Siberia is not over there in 
Russia…” (Cherkasov, 1884: 9). Now, this kind of 
sense was something dangerous for the Imperial 
Government, something that would make the 
Empire crumble – and something had to be done. 
And this was – to finally yoke the grumbling 
Siberians to the heartland of Russia with the 
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So, it is possible to see that there were both economical and socio-political reasons for 
the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway which began in 1890. 
In 1893 the newly constructed line reached Krasnoyarsk.  The project had been half 
finished and there was an urgent necessity in rails and ther heavy and bulky co struction 
materials such as cement (Johnson, 1907: 266).  There were actually only two options – the first 
was to drag the terribly heavy weight by cart using the old dirt road or to wait until the 
constructed railway line was free of any trains that were on it, but this would delay the 
construction of the line itself; the second – was to try to navigate the Northern Sea Route, which 
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fastest and most effective transportation route of 
the age – the railway. 
So, it is possible to see that there were both 
economical and socio-political reasons for the 
construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway which 
began in 1890.
In 1893 the newly constructed line reached 
Krasnoyarsk. The project had been half finished 
and there was an urgent necessity in rails and 
other heavy and bulky construction materials 
such as cement (Johnson, 1907: 266). There 
were actually only two options – the first was 
to drag the terribly heavy weight by cart using 
the old dirt road or to wait until the constructed 
railway line was free of any trains that were on 
it, but this would delay the construction of the 
line itself; the second – was to try to navigate 
the Northern Sea Route, which was again in the 
focus of British business. The latter worried 
the Russian Government, for it was not only 
fearing rivalry on the Siberian market, but also 
becoming constantly aware that if the British 
establish a fairly navigable route to Siberia – 
it would be subject to British economical 
influence. Willing to defend its territories the 
government decided to launch an expedition to 
the mouth of the Yenisei, where it would unload 
a large quantity of construction materials and 
bring in steamboats to establish a state flotilla 
on the river.
The 1893 Expedition is truly remarkable. In 
was the largest to that date expedition consisting 
of six vessels all of which successfully reached 
the Yenisei. The participants of the expedition 
were such notable personalities as Helen Peel (the 
granddaughter of Prime Minister Robert Peel) 
and Frederick Jackson (the English polar explorer 
who is notable for meeting F. Nansen on Franz 
Joseph Land). In Russian studies the expedition 
has been typically portrayed as an independent 
venture of the Imperial Government which, 
using the assistance of the British, convoyed its 
ships bearing the Russian colors to Siberia as if 
recognizing the Kara Sea Route as its domain, 
and called the Dobrotvorskii Expedition after the 
Russian naval commander of the expedition L.F. 
Dobrotvorskii (Pinkhenson, 1962: 177). However 
it was not at all like this. Two main sources which 
had proven to be controversial are the account of 
the expedition published by the Imperial Navy’s 
lieutenant V.I. Semenov and titled as the Zabitiy 
put’ iz Evropi v Sibir’. Eniseyskaya expeditsia 
1893 goda (Forgotten route from Europe to 
Siberia. The 1893 Yenisei expedition) (Semenov, 
1894) and the memoirs of J. Wiggins presented 
in The life and voyages of Joseph Wiggins FRGS 
by H. Johnson (Johnson, 1907) have been used in 
this study. 
The idea of sailing through the Kara Sea 
in 1893 originally came to F.W. Leybourne-
Popham – a wealthy country gentleman, who 
reputedly owned 12000 English acres, as well as 
a number of yachts. He was planning to become 
familiar with the Siberian market in order to 
establish a new Anglo-Siberian trading company. 
For the voyage he acquired a three-masted rigged 
schooner – the Blencathra: approximately 45 m 
long; draught about 4 m; and displacement 385 
metric tons. The ship had originally been named 
the Pandora II and was used by Allen Young 
as a polar exploration vessel, so it was sturdy 
enough for polar navigation and was additionally 
equipped with an ice-ram (Peel, 1894: 8). The 
secondary objective of the expedition was to 
collect dispatches which Nansen was to leave 
either at Khabarova or on Ostrov Diksona in 
a cairn (Nansen, 1956: 119). F. Jackson was 
intending to leave the Blencathra at Khabarova 
and travel across the tundra to Arkhangelsk in 
order to prepare for an expedition to the North 
Pole which was planned for 1894 (Jackson 1895: 
24). All these factors clearly point to the fact 
that the expedition had not been intended as 
one to transport Russian construction material 
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and convoy riverboats. Wiggins himself refers 
to the expedition as that, “…for the purpose of 
pleasure…” (Wiggins, 1894: 121). 
In fact it was the Russian Government that 
decided on knowing of the expedition to join it 
and bring 1600 tons of rails to Goltchikha along 
with a flotilla of riverboats (Wiggins, 1894: 121; 
Skinner, 2008: 180). When giving an interview 
on the planned joint venture Wiggins said: “To 
carry rails half around the world to Vladivostok, 
and then overland into the interior, was obviously 
absurd, when there was a splendid waterway 
from the north, navigable right up to the centre 
of the projected railway… One day they wired me 
from St. Petersburg – Can you bring 2000 tons 
of rails up the Yenisei to Krasnoyarsk? – I wired 
back – 20000 if you like.” (Johnson, 1907: 266). 
Wiggins accepted the task and chartered a 2500 
ton steamer, the Orestes to carry the rails (Stone, 
1994: 408). It was then sent to Middlesbrough – 
the Ironopolis – to purchase 1600 tons of rails 
from the Bell Brothers’ Concern. A steam 
schooner – the Minusinsk – had also been bought; 
it was loaded with gold-mining machinery 
and a number of goods for the Siberian market 
(Wiggins, 1894: 121).
The Russian party of the venture was sent to 
Dumbarton to the William Denny and Brothers’ 
Ltd shipbuilding company to obtain three 
vessels for the voyage. These were all named in 
honor of three participants of the Great Northern 
Expedition (1733-1743). The Leytenant Malygin 
was a side-wheel paddle river tugboat making at 
best 9 kn: about 50 m long; about 1 m draught; 
its single mast was rigged with lateen sails. The 
Leytenant Ovtsyn was a river tugboat with twin 
screw-propellers making at best 10 kn: about 
35 m long; about 2.5 m draught; its two masts 
were rigged with lateen sails. The Leytenant 
Skuratov was a lighter rigged as a schooner for 
the sea voyage with two masts: 35 m long; 2.5 m 
draught; and displacement 500 tons (Semenov, 
1894: 10). 
The two parties met at Vardø (Norway) on 
17 August (Peel, 1894: 30). On 22 August the 
Russian steamers with Minusinsk set sail, on 
the next day they were followed by the Orestes 
and Blencathra. They were escorted to the Kara 
Fig. 2. Russian vessels of the 1893 Expedition. On the left is Leytenant Scuratov; on the right is Leytenant 
Ovtsyn 
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rails (Stone, 1994: 408).  It was then sent to Middlesbrough – the Ironopolis – to purchase 1600 
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Straits by the Naezdnik – a clipper of the Imperial 
Navy (Semenov, 1894: 65). 
In most studies and sources Captain Wiggins 
is portrayed as the commander of the Anglo-
Russian Expedition (Johnson, 1907: 267; Stone, 
1994: 408). In fact the parties had no coordination 
of plans and basically while sailing through the 
Kara Sea they were two independent expeditions: 
the British one under the command of Wiggins 
and the Russian one under the command of 
Dobrotvorskii. The Russian naval officers had 
actually been surprised to find that Wiggins 
had no specific plan for the voyage. Basically it 
sounded as: “On crossing the Kara Sea the ships 
head east for the Yamal Peninsula; then head 
north along the coast of the Yamal keeping at 
depth of 15 m. On reaching Ostrov Bely, round 
it and head east to the mouth of the Yenisei.” 
Wiggins made only few improvements in the 
1872 charts. Semenov complained: “Having no 
desire of being prejudicial I may say that our 
expedition, having accomplished just a single 
hasty voyage, in the issue of chart improvement 
has given more valuable and rich results… It is 
not my desire to belittle the dignities of Wiggins, 
or least, cast a shadow on his indisputably 
worthy and remarkable reputation of a brave 
and experienced captain. Apparently he… had 
neither the sufficient amount of instruments as 
we had nor the same worthy crew…” (Semenov, 
1894: 52-54). 
Though the Russian naval officer made such 
a suggestion (apparently to be more delicate), it 
seems that the British actually did have charts 
of their own but were not willing to share them 
with the Russians especially in the circumstances 
when the Imperial Government claimed the 
Northern Sea Route for itself. It is plainly odd 
to suggest that the most experienced mariner of 
those waters, who was making his ninth voyage, 
would not be possessed of a map (Wiggins, 1894: 
121). The British captain also refused to cooperate 
with the Russians by flag signaling in conforming 
astronomical observations at noon to be certain of 
the latitude and longitude (Semenov, 1894: 101)
All these events made the Russians 
understand that the British are not at all 
interested in assisting it in the development of the 
Route; eventually in 1898 this would deprive the 
British of the free-port in Siberia, making their 
commercial transactions unprofitable and closing 
the Kara Sea for commercial enterprise for almost 
thirteen years. 
On 3 September the fleet safely arrived at 
Golchikha in the mouth of the Yenisei. After a 
series of ceremonies and a short celebration of the 
Russian Imperial Navy the unloading of the cargo 
from the Orestes onto river barges began. The 
steamboat Graf Ignatiev, a steam launch Bard, 
and six barges (one of these was simply a hull of an 
old steamboat, as the rest were made from wood) 
had been sent from Yeniseysk. Three barges had 
been sent by the governor and three belonged to 
the Gadalov merchants (these river-craft were in 
a very bad condition and would eventually fail) 
(Semenov, 1894: 104). There were approximately 
6000 rails to unload – a task that was supposed to 
be accomplished within a week (the Orestes had 
been chartered until 20 September), but a sudden 
shift of weather and constant storms proved this 
to be a tricky and dangerous business (Semenov, 
1894: 145). 
The place of anchorage was selected 
dramatically incorrectly – constant strong north 
winds made the open estuary of the Yenisei subject 
to fierce storms. The Russian steamboats were the 
first to suffer as their anchors started dragging 
during a particularly harsh gale; they sought cover 
in a cove opposite of Golchikha on the left bank 
at Zverievo. The naval officers pleaded Wiggins 
to either move the ships south to the Lukova 
Protoka (an anabranch some 200 km to the south) 
or at least to Zverievo. He, however, refused to do 
so because the Orestes had been chartered only 
– 38 –
Alexander E. Goncharov. The Trans-Siberian Railway and the Northern Sea Route
to arrive at Golchikha (Semenov, 1894: 106). In 
the end though on 17 September, seeing that the 
river-craft were incapable of withstanding the 
waves and accepting the freight, Wiggins agreed 
to move the ocean steamer to Zverievo where 
the unloading continued. The storms took a fee 
of three barges (all Gadalovs’) which had been 
thrown ashore with the cargo of rails on them. 
Out of 6000 rails 2936 were scattered on the 
river banks (the locals were offered to be paid 
60 kopeks per rail if they collected them during 
the winter), 300 rails were stacked at Golchikha, 
1600 were loaded on the remaining barges, and 
1100 were to be shipped to Arkhangelsk on the 
Orestes because there were no more barges left 
for them (Semenov, 1894: 127). 
On 20 September the ships departed from 
Golchikha: the Orestes and the Blencathra 
safely sailed back to Britain; the Minusinsk, the 
Russian steamboats, and barges headed upriver 
for Yeniseysk where they arrived on 23 October 
(Johnson, 1907: 275). 
Though the expedition was only a partial 
success, Wiggins and Dobrotvorskii were both 
awarded: the latter was made captain and Wiggins 
received personal gratitude from Alexander III 
in the form of a solid silver punchbowl, salver, 
ladle, and 25 mugs. In England he was awarded 
with Murchison Grant by the Royal Geographic 
Society (Stone, 1994: 408).
In 1894 the Committee of the Siberian 
Railway, again, turned to Wiggins and 
Leybourne-Popham, requesting them to deliver 
two steam paddleboats the Perviy and Vtoroy to 
the Yenisei (Kinloch, 1898: 25). Both ships had 
been built by Sir W.G. Armstrong Whitworth 
& Co Ltd in Newcastle upon Tyne. Leybourne-
Popham acquired the Stjernen, a 700-ton 
screw-propeller steamer to pilot and supply the 
Russian steamboats with coal and carry a cargo 
of various products including salted herring 
and other foodstuffs to Siberia. Among the 
three passengers aboard the Stjernen were S.V. 
Vostrotin (a wealthy Siberian gold miner) and his 
wife who were returning from their honeymoon 
to Yeniseysk (Johnson, 1907: 286). The expedition 
safely reached Lukova Protoka on 13 September 
where the steam riverboats were delivered to the 
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who were returning from their honeymoon to Yeniseysk (Johnson, 1907: 286).  The expedition 
safely reached Lukova Protoka on 13 September where the steam riverboats were delivered to 
the representatives of the Committee and the cargo from the Stjernen was discharged. 
On 15 September the steamer headed homeward.  This voyage turned out to be a disaster: 
on 22 September the Stjernen hit reefs in foggy weather just ten miles from the Yugorsky Shar.  
The ship was abandoned and the whole crew sought refuge in Khabarova from where they 
headed on sledge to Arkhangelsk (Byford, 1895: 45). 
Fig. 3. Crew of the Stjernen on their arrival in Arkhangelsk 
The expeditions of 1893/94 assisted the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway – to 
some extent – by delivering bulky freight, such as construction materials and riverboats 
necessary f r its construction, to the Siberia mainl nd.  The logistic  of these expeditions is 
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representatives of the Committee and the cargo 
from the Stjernen was discharged.
On 15 September the steamer headed 
homeward. This voyage turned out to be a 
disaster: on 22 September the Stjernen hit reefs in 
foggy weather just ten miles from the Yugorsky 
Shar. The ship was abandoned and the whole 
crew sought refuge in Khabarova from where 
they headed on sledge to Arkhangelsk (Byford, 
1895: 45).
The expeditions of 1893/94 assisted the 
construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway – to 
some extent – by delivering bulky freight, such as 
construction materials and riverboats necessary 
for its construction, to the Siberian mainland. The 
logistics of these expeditions is truly remarkable – 
it was not only a link between two countries, but 
between some of the most important transportation 
networks in the world. For some time it seemed to 
many that the NRS will develop as a joint venture 
of the Russian Government and British business, 
and the commercial prosperity of Siberia was 
at hand. However, it was the Trans-Siberian 
Railway which eventually permitted the Russian 
Government to close the free ports of Siberia in 
1898. This ripped the heart out of the established 
commerce – it could not be profitable if there was 
a tax to be paid. The freight rates were too high 
and the risks had dropped insignificantly. The last 
expedition of the Leybourne-Popham Syndicate 
was in 1899, after this the enterprise ceased its 
existence (Goncharov, 2008: 233). Again there 
were voices of disappointment coming from 
Siberia – they were again treated like some 
colony. But they were not as loud as before, 
because the Trans-Siberian Railway was slowly 
changing the face of Siberian economy. New 
industries and towns were appearing. They were 
almost all connected to the railway. A working 
class was forming in the cities and towns. New 
goods were being delivered at a lower price with 
greater speed, and it was finally possible to reach 
Europe within a week of travel. The railway was 
working and gradually uniting the country. 
In 1904 the Russian Empire became engaged 
in a military conflict with Japan in the Far East. 
Almost as soon as the war began it became 
evident, that the single line of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway could not convey the necessary military 
freight, not to mention freight for civilians or 
passengers. Trains waited their turn at depots 
and station to continue their way, but stopped 
at the next station and waited again. Sometimes 
it took weeks to cover what could have been 
covered earlier within days2. Once again, the 
country was divided into two parts. Something 
had to be done very quickly, and the government 
again remembered that there existed a sea route 
to Siberia.
Not only was the matter of delivering freight 
at stake. After the disaster of the Rozhdestvenski 
Expedition in 1904 the Government was urgent to 
try alternative sea route to reach Port Arthur and 
the Far East, not the one through militant waters.
The Minister of Ways of Communication 
Prince M.I. Khilkov proposed to use the NRS to 
deliver a cargo of military equipment and railway 
construction equipment along with a number 
of steamboats and lighters to the Yenisei River, 
repeating the 1893 Expedition. On 28 March 
1905 at the council of the Osoboye Soveshanie 
(Imperial Special Commission) in 
St. Petersburg it was decided to conduct a 
naval expedition to Yeniseysk, via the Kara Sea3. 
In order to deliver the freight down the Yenisei it 
was decided to create a sufficient state flotilla on 
the river. A delegation led by A.I. Vilkitski was 
sent to Great Britain and Germany to obtain the 
necessary vessels. Fifteen ships were purchased 
in Britain, Germany, and in the Netherlands. 
The Angara, Lena, Minusinsk, Turukhansk 
were produced at Dordrecht Holland Wilton 
Engineering Shipyard in Rotterdam; the 
Krasnoyarsk and Yeniseysk were built at 
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Alexander Stephens and Sons Ltd shipyard in 
Dundee. The lighters were built in Hamburg and 
Bremen at the Waltjen & Co shipyard.
In addition to the river-craft, the Ministry of 
Ways of Communication chartered three German 
ocean-class steamers to tow the lighters and a 
number of steamers to transport the cargo to the 
mouth of the Yenisei. The Expedition was also 
escorted by the Yermak icebreaker. 
Originally it was planned that Captain 
Wiggins would be in charge of the venture, but 
unfortunately the pioneer of the NRS became 
seriously ill and died on 13 September. Up 
to his last he cooperated with the Russians 
assisting them with possible advice (Stone, 
1994: 409).
The 1905 Expedition proved to be a success. 
It reached Golchikha on 27 August. Over 8000 
tons of cargo were successfully discharged onto 
the lighters and additional barges sent from 
Yeniseysk4. The rails and construction materials 
were used in the construction of the Circum-
Baikal Railway, which eliminated the necessity 
employing ferries to transport trains across 
Lake Baikal. Not a single ship had been lost. 
The steamboats were used on the Yenisei and 
Angara. This was the largest NRS expedition 
of the Imperial Government. The Soviet Kara 
Expeditions inherited this valuable experience 
of the Russian Empire. The Ministry of Ways 
of Communication planned to arrange another 
major expedition to the Yenisei in 1906, but 
the war with Japan ended the same year and, 
as it has been typical in Russian history, it 
was forgotten. In order to support the Siberian 
market with civilian goods, the Government 
even opened a free-port on the Yenisei in 
1904 – 1905. However, it existed only until the 
war was on: as soon as it ended the Imperial 
Government again lost interest in the NRS, but 
it provided that no other nation would overtake 
the initiative.
Conclusion
During the Expeditions of 1893, 1894, and 
1905 the Ministry of Ways of Communication 
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Source: Severnaya morskaya expeditsia, 1906: 13-14
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delivered a large number of steamboats and 
railway construction materials to the mouth of 
the River Yenisei. These were the first successful 
governmental expeditions into these waters. 
Prior to these expeditions the Government 
refused to take an active part in developing this 
route and relied on foreign companies to develop 
a sufficient transportation route to Siberia. The 
1893 Expedition showed that the British were not 
at all interested in cooperation with the Russians 
and even feared Imperial expansion into what 
they considered as “their waters”. Trying to 
keep foreigners away from the Kara Sea, the 
Government denounced the free-port, which 
had existed in the Ob’ and Yenisei. The British 
maritime companies were economically driven 
out of Siberia. Even though the method was 
crude, it offered a partial brake for the Russian 
Empire to realize what belonged to it and what 
methods were to be inflicted in order to develop 
the northern seaside. In 1905 the NRS again 
proved navigable and was used to successfully 
deliver cargo to Siberia without having to use 
the overloaded Trans-Siberian Railway. This 
time, the expedition was totally Russian without 
any foreigners conducting it. It was the first time 
in Arctic history when an attempt to use the 
icebreaker Yermak to convoy the flotilla thought 
the ice was made. 
Despite the success of the aforementioned 
expeditions, it took another thirty years to start 
full-scale expeditions on a regular basis through 
the Kara Sea – the Kara Expeditions. The steamers 
and barges were convoyed by icebreakers, and 
navigation in Russian Arctic waters became a 
trivial matter. 
1 http://history.nsc.ru/kapital/project/us/1-2-1.html#en60
2 The Board of Trade Journal (50) (London: Printed for His Majesty’s Stationary Office by Jas Truscott & Son, Ltd, 1905). 
207 – 208.
3 Severnaya morskaya expeditsia ministerstva putiey soobshenia na reku Yenisei v 1905 godu (The Northern Maritime 
Expedition of the Ministry of Ways of Communication to the Yenisei River in 1905). (St. Petersburg, 1906). 11.
4 Ibid., 57 – 58.
5 The Board of Trade Journal (50) (London: Printed for His Majesty’s Stationary Office by Jas Truscott & Son, Ltd, 1905). 
303 – 304.
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Транссибирская железная дорога  
и Северный морской путь
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В настоящее время Транссибирская железнодорожная магистраль – важная транспортная 
артерия, соединяющая Сибирь и Европейскую Россию. Она является практически полностью 
самообслуживаемой. Однако мало кому известно, что в период своего строительства 
в 90-е гг. XIX в. и в начале XX в. большое количество строительных материалов и речных 
судов для железной дороги доставлялось по Северному морскому пути на Енисей. Всего 
таких экспедиций было три: в 1893, 1894 и 1905 гг. В статье описана логистика упомянутых 
экспедиций; также рассмотрены взаимоотношения британских морских компаний и 
Российского правительства.
Ключевые слова: Северный морской путь, Транссибирская железная дорога, речные суда.
